Wednesday, November 26, 2014

SHOOT FIRST, GIVE ORDERS LATER

I don't think there is much of anything behind the outrage about the killing of Michael Brown in Ferguson but THIS is inexcusable:
Video: Cop shot boy seconds after encountering him
By MARK GILLISPIE 2 hours ago

CLEVELAND (AP) — The police officer who fatally shot a 12-year-old boy carrying a pellet gun fired within 1½ to 2 seconds of pulling up in his cruiser, police said Wednesday. During those few moments, he ordered the youngster three times to put up his hands, they said.
The video is also up at ABC News.

UPDATE: WKYC has provided a slow-motion version of the video and now it seems the cop in the front passeger's seat got out & shot Tamir Rice immediately.  I've embedded the clip below -

HANNITY IS RICH BECAUSE HE LIES ALL THE TIME

Last week on his radio show, he claimed that Hispanics were divided about Pres. Obama's new immigration policy and here's the truth:
‘This is the most unified we have seen Latino public opinion’
11/25/14 11:15 AM—Updated 11/25/14 11:43 AM
By Steve Benen
The Maddow Blog

Adrian Carrasquillo reported yesterday on new survey data that shows “Latino voters have Obama’s back again.”
That’s according to a new poll by Latino Decisions, for Presente.org and Mi Familia Vota, the first of Latino voters since Obama announced sweeping executive actions, given to BuzzFeed News ahead of its announcement on Monday.
 
The poll found that 89% of Latino voters support Obama’s decision to give temporary legal status to nearly five million undocumented immigrants. That level of support surprised Latino Decisions co-founder Matt Barreto, who noted the figure is higher than initial support of the president’s 2012 Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, which protected undocumented youth brought to the country as children from deportation and allowed them to receive work permits.
“This is the most unified we have seen Latino public opinion on any issue,” Barreto told BuzzFeed News. “DACA registered 84%, this is even higher.

Tuesday, November 25, 2014

EZRA KLEIN NEEDS TO GET OUT MORE

Ezra attacks officer Darren Wilson's grand jury testimony because Ezra is naive. He doesn't think an 18 year old black male would talk like this:
Brown's response to "what's wrong with the sidewalk?", as recorded by Wilson, is "fuck what you have to say." Remember, Wilson is a uniformed police officer, in a police car, and Brown is an 18-year-old kid who just committed a robbery. And when asked to use the sidewalk, Wilson says Brown replied, "Fuck what you have to say."

Wilson backs his car up and begins to open the door. "Hey, come here," he said to the kid who just cursed at him. He says Brown replied, "What the fuck you gonna do?" And then Brown, in Wilson's telling, slams the car door closed.

Brown sees him go for the gun. And he replies: "You're too much of a fucking pussy to shoot me."

GIULIANI WASN'T TERRIBLY OUT OF LINE

He said that white police are in black neighborhoods because blacks kill each other so much.

The CDC collects statistics on mortality and the results in 2010 for young black males is depressing:

Here are the same statistics for white males.





LOTS OF PEOPLE ARE UPSET ABOUT THE FERGUSON GRAND JURY FINDING

I heard part of what the local DA said & it seemed convincing so right now I disagree with a lot of prominent liberal commenters like one of my favorites, Billmon:
2h2 hours ago
. McCulloch obviously didn't want to prosecute, but he was also too chickenshit to take the heat for not prosecuting. (1)

Sunday, November 23, 2014

APPENDIX 1 OF THE BENGHAZI REPORT

This was endorsed by 4 Republicans on the HPSCI: Mike Rogers, Mike Conaway, Jeff Miller and Peter King.  The sentences highlighted in red show that these 4 are still hoping to find a conspiracy about Ambassador Rice's initial public statements.



Appendix 1

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF CHAIRMAN ROGERS AND REPRESENTATIVES CONAWAY,
MILLER, AND KING
     The events in Benghazi, Libya, on September 11-12, 2012, reveal both successes and failures, which can be summarized simply as follows:
* The CIA officers who responded to the terrorist attacks in Benghazi saved American lives. Without their efforts, the terrorists would have killed many more Americans.
* Senior State Department officials dismissed repeated threat warnings and denied requests for additional security in eastern Libya thereby placing U.S. personnel at unnecessary risk.
* The U.S. military's response to the Benghazi attack was severely degraded because of the location and readiness posture of U.S. forces, and because of a lack of clarity about how the terrorist action was unfolding.
* Senior U.S. officials perpetuated an inaccurate story that matched the Administration's misguided view that the United States was nearing a victory over al-Qa'ida.
* The Administration's failed policies continue to undermine the national security interests of the United States.

A Mixed Story of Heroism and Policy Failure

      Benghazi, in part, is a story of heroism. The quick actions of CIA's Chief of Tripoli Station, Chief of Benghazi Base, the CIA security officers, and U.S. military personnel saved American lives on the night of September 11, 2012. Tyrone Woods and Glen Doherty were part of a devoted band of brothers that continues to work in the shadows, in some of the most dangerous places on earth, with no expectation of public acclaim. With remarkable bravery and limited resources, these CIA officers left their base, scaled walls, repeatedly crawled into smoke-filled rooms, rescued their State Department colleagues, searched for and recovered the body of Sean Smith, and battled trained terrorists with greater firepower to defend U.S. interests in Benghazi. Had they been asked to, these men would have stayed and continued to fight.

      The bravery of these men, however, contrasts with the failure of senior U.S. officials to provide for the defense of U.S. interests against a known and growing terrorist threat in the region. Americans who serve in dangerous locations will always assume some risk. For example, collecting intelligence about terrorist threats to America often requires Americans to live and work in insecure environments. It is, however, the responsibility and duty of policymakers and senior U.S. officials to monitor evolving threats to U.S. personnel and take action to reduce or address that risk. In this case, U.S. military assets were not positioned or prepared to aid Americans in Libya, and the State Department failed to provide sufficient security for its facility in Benghazi. Those are the known failures of Benghazi.

      America will always rely on the patriotism, bravery, and expertise of Americans who place themselves in harm's way to pursue and defend America's interests. We should celebrate all Americans on the front lines, honor those who lost their lives in service to us, and take every step possible to avoid such tragedies in the future.

The Administration's False View of the Terrorist Threat

      Throughout his first term—and particularly during the 2012 presidential election cycle—President Obama consistently stated that al-Qa'ida is on the decline, especially by highlighting the death of Osama bin Laden at the hands of U.S. Special Forces. This sentiment was echoed repeatedly by various Administration officials. For example, on April 30, 2012, then-National Security Adviser for Counterterrorism and Homeland Security John Brennan told an audience at the Woodrow Wilson Center: "When we assess the al-Qa'ida of 2012, I think it's fair to say that, as a result of our efforts, the United States is more secure and the American people are safer."  On June 12, 2012, then-U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice told graduates of the Ohio State University that "al-Qa'ida is on its way to defeat."  Even after the Benghazi attacks, the administration's narrative continued. A media report found that the President had described al-Qa'ida as being "decimated," "on the path to defeat," or some other variation at least 32 times in the 50 days following the Benghazi attacks.

      This repeated assessment did not comport with the facts. Counterterrorism pressure against al-Qa'ida in Pakistan encouraged the decentralization of the organization. As a result, alQa'ida affiliates increased their capability and operations in expanding safe havens across the Middle East and Africa, including Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Somalia, Egypt, Mali, Algeria, Tunisia, Gaza, and Libya. From some of these safe havens, al-Qa'ida affiliates and like-minded global jihadists fomented instability and continued to plot against western interests.

The al-Qa'ida affiliates remain generally responsive to al-Qa'ida senior leadership in Pakistan.

The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant recently split from al-Qa'ida, but it is perhaps more intent on plotting against the United States and Western interests abroad.

In recent years, al-Qa'ida senior leadership has directed some affiliates to refrain from publically announcing their affiliation with al-Qa'ida in an effort to avert U.S. counterterrorism pressure.

      The Obama Administration's public reaction to the Benghazi terrorist attacks—focusing on limited intelligence reporting about a spontaneous protest caused by an anti-Islam film while downplaying reports indicating the attacks were preplanned and carried out by known al-Qa'ida associates—highlights the Administration's misguided view of the terrorist threat.

State Department Failures
      The Administration's flawed perception that al-Qa'ida was on the decline contributed to inadequate Diplomatic Security protection in Benghazi. Evidence received by HPSCI largely confirms the findings of other investigations that, prior to the attacks, the State Department did not respond sufficiently to the deteriorating threat environment in eastern Libya.' These failures were not due to inadequate reporting by the intelligence community about threats to U.S. and Western interests in Benghazi. The IC provided updates to relevant agencies, including the State Department, on the deteriorating security environment in Benghazi.
      First, previous reports state that senior officials at the State Department, including then-Secretary Hillary Clinton, received numerous reports of attacks in and around Benghazi. Those same officials, however, did not approve repeated requests for additional security. We hope that other ongoing investigations, which focus on the State Department, will uncover the responsible officials and hold them accountable for this failure.
      Eyewitness accounts received by HPSCI provide concrete examples of the effects of those decisions. DS officers themselves felt ill-equipped and ill-trained to contend with the threat environment in Benghazi. According to HPSCI evidence, DS agents talked about their concerns and about their requests for additional resources. At least one member of the CIA security team testified that prior to September 11, 2012, he warned DS agents that they were going to die at the Temporary Mission Facility (TMF) if they were attacked. CIA personnel also assessed that the TMF was a very large compound with too few guards and lots of space for attackers, such as snipers, to hide. Finally, testimony suggests that some of the DS agents' performance in defense of the TMF was lacking and only one of the DS agents participated in the defense of the Annex during the final deadly attack there. Other DS officers were described as combat-ineffective and may have been in shock.

Limited U.S. Military Ability to Respond
      The House Armed Services Committee Benghazi report concluded that the U.S. military's response to the Benghazi attack was severely degraded because of the location and readiness posture of the U.S forces, and because of lack of clarity about how the terrorist action was unfolding.") Eyewitness testimony received by HPSCI validates that finding. After the attacks began, the CIA expected to wait approximately 18 hours for AFRICOM personnel recovery or combat search and rescue assets to arrive.1112
CIA Communication with Headquarters
      The on-the-record testimony and available evidence make clear that the leaders on the ground in Benghazi expeditiously considered critical tactical factors, including the difficult decision of whether it was safe to leave the Annex exposed and unguarded by the mobile security force in order to perform a rescue mission of the TMF, and whether the team was likely to be ambushed between the Annex and the TMF. There is no evidence that anybody in Washington or in Tripoli played any role in this tactical decision making process. Further, allegations that the Chief of Tripoli Station was in some way dissuaded from sending an emergency message to Washington are also false. Tripoli Station was sending regular situation reports back to Washington and the Chief of Tripoli Station was in continuous electronic communication with appropriate authorities at CIA Headquarters. He had no need for and did not ever consider sending an emergency message.

Ambassador Rice's Inaccurate Public Statements Remain Unexplained
      Ambassador Rice's November 27, 2012, comments following her meeting with Acting CIA Director Morell, Senator McCain, Senator Graham, and Senator Ayotte suggest that she relied on the CIA-drafted talking points for her media appearances in September 2012. Following that meeting, she told reporters:

In the course of the meeting, we explained that the talking points provided by the Intelligence Community, and the initial assessment upon which they were based, were incorrect in a key respect: there was no protest or demonstration in Benghazi.

      It is unclear whether, prior to her media appearances in September 2012, Ambassador Rice received briefings on the available eyewitness accounts or other assessments that suggested there was not a protest. As then-Deputy Director of the CIA Michael Morell testified, he was aware that there was conflicting information about whether or not there was a protest." He further testified that he had informed policy-makers through the Deputies Committee at the White House that there was conflicting information. In fact, in an adamant email on September 15, 2012, the Chief of Station in Tripoli stated that there had been no protest.  Deputy Director Morell testified that he informed the Deputies Committee that the Chief of Station held a view that contradicted assessments that there was a protest. What is not currently known is whether any of the information or the views of those on the ground in Libya was communicated to Susan Rice by the White House prior to her press appearances on September 16, 2012.
      It is also not yet known whether she had knowledge of the previous attacks in Benghazi, the deteriorating threat environment in Benghazi, or the terrorist groups that posed a threat to U.S. interests in Benghazi. As the face of the U.S. Government, Ambassador Rice had the responsibility to understand the full context and communicate truthfully to the American people. While Chairman Rogers was in receipt of the same talking points that Ambassador Rice used, he immediately questioned Ambassador Rice's conclusion that that the attack was a spontaneous demonstration in response to the anti-Islamic video. Instead he focused on what he knew about the attacks. He said:

It seemed to be a military-style, coordinated (attack). They had indirect fire, coordinated with direct fire, rocket attacks. They were able to launch two different separate attacks on locations there near the consulate and they repelled a fairly significant Libyan force that came to rescue the Embassy. And then it was on 9/11 and there is other information, classified information, that we have that just makes you stop for a minute and pause.

      It is unclear why Ambassador Rice appeared to rely so heavily on talking points drafted for the Committee when the HPSCI Chairman disregarded those very talking points as useless. We trust that the truth about what Ambassador Rice knew in the days before and after the attacks will come to light in the course of other ongoing investigations.

Then-Deputy Director of the CIA Michael Morell 's Role in The Talking Points

      Michael Morell testified at length about his role in developing the talking points used by Susan Rice to describe the attacks. He admitted that the process was flawed and produced a poor product. Mr. Morell admitted he understood the State Department's concerns with the original draft of the talking points that highlighted previous threat warnings and attacks in the region.
      Mr. Morell made a large number of edits after a September  White House Deputies Committee meeting. He removed the warning language and removed the word "Islamic" from the sentence: "There are indications that Islamic extremists participated in the attacks."  He testified that he did so "because I did not think it wise to say something publicly—in particular a religious reference—that might add even more volatility to an already agitated situation in the Middle East and North Africa." Mr. Morell also testified that his edits were not due to White House influence or State Department concerns. Rather, his edits were based on what he though was "fair to say."
      We conclude that Mr. Morell operated beyond his role as CIA Deputy Director and inserted himself into a policy-making and public-affairs role. Rather than simply providing policymakers the facts as best understood, he made edits based on what he felt was "fair to say." It is simply unfathomable that the White House's policy preferences, or the concerns of the State Department senior officials, did not factor into his calculation about what was fair. For these reasons, we believe that Mr. Morell's testimony was at times inconsistent and incomplete.

Insufficient Action to Bring Benghazi Attackers to Justice

      The Executive Branch has not exerted sufficient effort to bring the Benghazi attackers to justice. The Committee has conducted four closed hearings and several briefings on the efforts to identify, track, and bring to justice the Benghazi attackers. Specifically, Majority Members of HPSCI have found that the government limited itself by treating the investigation as a criminal matter, rather than a counterterrorism mission. Moreover, policy decisions preclude agencies from using available authorities and resources to address the growing al Qa'ida threat are placing the United States at undue risk.

      The FBI-led investigation was hampered by the dangerous environment. FBI investigators did not get on the ground in Benghazi until three weeks after the attacks and did not stay in Benghazi overnight. They were unable to conduct extensive interviews of locals who may have witnessed the attacks. FBI labored to build a criminal case against a subset of suspected attackers, but the Libyan government was either unwilling or incapable of protecting U.S. officials in Benghazi—even for short periods of time.

      Senior officials from the National Counterterrorism Center, CIA, the Department of Defense, and the FBI testified before the Committee on the efforts against the Benghazi attackers. It is clear that there was inadequate interagency coordination in response to the attacks. Further, based on FBI and DoD testimony, the Administration devoted inadequate resources to this effort and lacked a sense of urgency.

      The capture of Ansar al Sharia commander Abu Khattalah is a noteworthy success. The delay in the operation, however, highlights the Administration's low risk tolerance and inability to track multiple targets at one time. The government was pursuing Abu Khattalah for an extensive period of time and developed several joint operations to capture him. As publicly reported, the United States was poised to conduct a capture operation in the Fall of 2013. However, the Administration abandoned that operation, even though he had been openly operating in Benghazi for months and was interviewed by CNN and New York Times reporters. Following his capture, the Department of Justice charged and plans to try Khattalah for conspiracy to provide material support and resources to terrorists resulting in death.

      Interagency testimony following the capture operation indicated that the U.S. Government still has not dedicated sufficient resources to capturing additional Benghazi suspects. This assessment should not be construed to minimize the exemplary brave and heroic actions of the defense, law enforcement, and intelligence officers involved in the capture operation. If the Administration prioritized these operations, brought additional resources and authorities to bear, and exercised its will to act unilaterally, it could better free itself of unnecessary self-imposed constraints.
      Despite the Administration's wish that al-Qa'ida posed a diminishing threat following the death of Osama bin Laden, the Benghazi terrorist attacks were just one of a new and increasing number of global plots to kill Americans. Prior to and following the Benghazi terrorist attacks, the Obama Administration has failed to devote the appropriate focus and resources to the threat al-Qa'ida, its affiliates, and like-minded groups pose to U.S. and Western interests.
Conclusion
      The events in Benghazi are a tragic outcome of years of flawed policies. Risk is inherent in many locations when Americans bravely serve to protect America's interests. But bad policy decisions can significantly increase that risk. In Libya, the Administration took limited military action against the government, but failed to establish a functioning government to control the terrain or provide sufficient security for the Americans remaining in the rapidly deteriorating country. A few dozen courageous Americans volunteered to live and work in Benghazi. The CIA professionals located there were appropriately collecting foreign intelligence on the burgeoning terrorist safe haven. The men who protected those intelligence professionals proactively put their lives on the lines to rescue their poorly-equipped State Department colleagues on September 11, 2012. Two of those CIA officers lost their lives.
      Rather than acknowledge that its policy in Libya contributed to the deaths of these Americans, the Administration became attached to the notion that the attacks were caused by a video. Rather than recognize that the threat from al-Qa'ida and its affiliates had not decreased, but had in fact increased, the Administration continued to perpetuate the myth that it had nearly defeated al-Qa'ida. White House communicators want desperately for Benghazi not to be about White House policy. Tragedies like Benghazi, however, will happen with more frequency when policies do not acknowledge the threats we face.
      This Committee concluded that there was no stand down order. There were no illegal intelligence activities on the ground in the days before the attacks. There was no intimidation or threats to witnesses. But there is responsibility for the tragedy nonetheless. The blame rests with those who refused to recognize risk and think strategically. The blame rests with those officials who failed to ensure America's front-line professionals had the tools, resources, authorities, and assets to succeed in the fight we are in.

EPISTEMIC CLOSURE TO THE RESCUE

Based on previous research & personal observation, I'm not surprised that some conservatives refuse to accept the findings of the latest Benghazi and the denial goes all the way to the highest ranking conservatives:
Graham: House GOP Benghazi report 'full of crap'
By Rebecca Shabad - 11/23/14 09:29 AM EST
THE HILL

Host Gloria Borger said the report found no one lied.

“That’s a bunch of garbage,” Graham replied.

Saturday, November 22, 2014

WHEN FOX NEWS DID ITS OWN REPORTING ON THE LATEST BENGHAZI REPORT

instead of relying on the AP, it failed to state that there was no "stand down order" and no effort by the Federal government, including Obama and Hillary, to mislead the American public. This time, comments are still open.

CIA gathered intelligence on weapons to Syria: Benghazi report

By Catherine Herridge, Pamela Browne
Published November 22, 2014
FoxNews.com

A leading Republican wants to expand the House investigation into the 2012 Benghazi terrorist attack by adding a Senate probe, as a new House Intelligence Committee report Friday concluded that the initial CIA assessment found no demonstrations prior to the assault and a primary purpose of the CIA operation in eastern Libya was to track the movement of weapons to Syria.

The report described the attack as "complex" with the attackers affiliated with Al Qaeda. It also said the initial CIA assessment concluded there were no demonstrations outside the State Department Consulate in Eastern Libya.

Referring to the House Select committee Chairman, and the Democratic ranking member, Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-SC, said the current House investigation should be expanded.
"(Republican) Trey Gowdy and (Democrat) Elijah Cummings have done a good job,” he said. “I can't imagine the U.S. Senate not wanting to be a part of a joint select committee. We'll bootstrap to what you've done, but we want to be part of discussion," Graham told Fox News. "What I would suggest to (incoming Senate majority leader) Mitch McConnell is to call up Speaker Boehner and say 'Listen, we want to be part of this’."

Graham, along with his two Republican colleagues, Sen. John McCain of Arizona and Kelly Ayotte of New Hampshire, have been outspoken advocates of a special investigation, because they say then-acting director of the CIA Mike Morell misled them about his role in crafting the so-called media talking points that blamed an opportunistic protest gone awry for the assault.

"Number one, Mike Morrell misled three senators," Graham said of their November 2012 meeting on Capitol Hill, where Morell accompanied then UN Ambassador Susan Rice to explain her flawed explanation on national television five days after the attack.
"I think it's important that for future CIA personnel to understand, that if you come to Congress and you’re asked a question and you give a deceptive answer, you tell half the story, not the entire story, you play word games, it will follow you and will be unacceptable," Graham said.

On Friday, with little fanfare, the House Intelligence Committee released the findings of its two year, bi-partisan investigation into the terrorist attack. The 37 page report found that the first, internal CIA assessment was accurate -- that no protests were involved -- but then-CIA Director David Petraeus, Morell and the administration latched onto information that supported the flawed demonstration scenario.

Fox News was first to report on September 17, 2012, one day after Rice's controversial Sunday talk show appearances, that there were no protests when the attack unfolded.
"One day after the assault, on 9/12/12, the first CIA assessment about the attacks, a September 12th Executive update, said ‘the presence of armed assailants from the incident’s outset suggests this was an intentional assault and not the escalation of a peaceful protest,” investigators found.  And while intelligence gaps remain, "No witness has reported believing at any point that the attacks were anything but terrorist acts,” the report added.

On Saturday September 14, 2012, Deputy National Security Adviser Ben Rhodes wrote in an email titled "PREP CALL with Susan," that one of the goals for the administration's public statements should be "To underscore that these protests are rooted in an Internet video, and not a broader failure of policy."  The House report says these conclusions were "incorrect."

Judicial Watch, not Congress, obtained the Rhodes email as the result of a federal lawsuit.
The Obama White House did not move away from the protest explanation for the attack that killed four Americans - Ambassador Chris Stevens, State Department Foreign Service officer Sean Smith, and former Navy Seals and CIA contractors Ty Woods and Glenn Doherty - until September 20, when then White House Spokesman Jay Carney told reporters 'It is, I think, self-evident that what happened in Benghazi was a terrorist attack,” and the State Department did the same much later.

The report found the CIA's Office of Public Affairs made three “substantive” changes to the talking points that included the removal of references to Al Qaeda and swapping the word "attacks" with "demonstrations."  It is not clear from the publicly available, and heavily redacted emails exactly who made the changes and who directed them, since the CIA public affairs office would be unlikely to make these changes unilaterally.

When Morell retired from the CIA last year, he told The Wall Street Journal he hoped to advise a presidential campaign, with anonymous sources telling the paper Morell was close to Hillary Clinton. Morell now works as a counselor at Beacon Global Strategies, a Washington D.C. firm closely aligned with the former secretary of State. He is also a national security analyst for CBS News. The President of CBS News is David Rhodes, the brother of Obama's Deputy National Security Adviser Ben Rhodes.

An appendix filed by Democrats did not find evidence of “political motivations,” and Morell is praised for testifying “freely and openly” about the process.  Four Republicans, including chairman Mike Rogers, concluded “Mr. Morell operated beyond his role as CIA Deputy Director and inserted himself into a policy making and public affairs role….It is simply unfathomable that the White House’s policy preferences, or the concerns of the State Department senior officials, did not factor into his calculation about what was fair.  For these reasons, we believe that Mr. Morell’s testimony was at time inconsistent and incomplete.”

The House report leaves no doubt that the attack drew heavily on “those affiliated with al-Qai’da,”  including AQIM (Al Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb), AAS (Ansar al-sharia), AQAP (Al Qaeda in Yemen), AQI (Al Qaeda in Iraq) as well as the Egypt based Jamal Network.  As Fox News was first to report, and the committee investigation affirms, at least two long time Al Qaeda operatives, Faraj al-Chalabi, and former Guantanamo detainee Sufian bin Qumu, were significant players in the assault.

House investigators concluded that "CIA accurately assessed on September 12, and 13, 2012 that members of AAS (Ansar al-Sharia) and of various al-Qai'da affiliates perpetrated the attacks."  And that as more was known about the attacks the "CIA gained corroborating reporting to support their previous assessments."

The House report adds more weight to the conclusion that the attack was pre-meditated because it pulled together more than 80 operatives -- some from outside of Libya --for the assault and it drew on a skilled mortar team.  "The Tripoli security chief recalled that the mortar fire was far more accurate than anything he had seen during his tour in Afghanistan," it said.

The report also shed new light on the CIA operation in Benghazi. Morell said the CIA annex was in eastern Libya “collecting intelligence about foreign entities that were themselves collecting weapons in Libya and facilitating their passage to Syria. The Benghazi Annex was not itself collecting weapons.”

Newly declassified testimony before the House Intelligence Committee attached to the House report from the Director of National intelligence, James Clapper, as well as Morell, confirmed to lawmakers that the weapons shipments were known at the highest levels of the U.S. government.
Rep. Devin Nunes: Are we aware of any arms that are leaving that area and going into Syria?
Mr. Morell: Yes, sir.
General Clapper: Yes
Nunes:  And who was coordinating that?
Mr. Morell: I believe the (redacted) are coordinating that.
Nunes: And were the CIA folks that were there, were they helping to coordinate that, or were they watching it, were they gathering information about it?
Mr. Morell: Sir, the focus of my officers in Benghazi was (redacted) to try to penetrate terrorist groups that were there so we could learn their plans, intentions and capabilities (redacted.)
The discussion is cut short by Rogers, who says not all members present have sufficient security clearances to hear further details.  Fox News was first to question in October 2012 the significance of weapons shipments from Libya to Syria via Turkey, and who in the administration was read in on the program.

In a joint statement, the committee's Republican chairman Mike Rogers of Michigan, and ranking member, Dutch Ruppersburger, D-Md., said "...there was no intelligence failure prior to the attacks but the early intelligence assessments and the Administrations’ public narrative on the causes and motivations for the attack were not fully accurate. A mixed group of individuals, including those affiliated with al-Qa’ida, participated in the attacks. Finally, the Committee found no evidence that CIA conducted any unauthorized activities in Benghazi and CIA did not intimidate any officer or otherwise dissuade them from telling their stories to Congress"

A QUESTION FOR REP. TREY GOWDY

Now that the HPSCI has found there was no WH conspiracy to hide information about Benghazi, perhaps Mr. Gowdy can tell us exactly what is his evidence for claiming that there was one.

I WASN'T SURE IF THIS STORY WAS FROM A MASS MARKET NOVEL OR A TABLOID...

(h/t Atrios)

maybe even a tabloid in a novel but it now seems terrifyingly real:

Media ‘gagged over bid to report MP child sex cases’

Security services accused of aiding Westminster paedophilia cover-up

Daniel Boffey policy editor
Saturday 22 November 2014 06.33 EST
THE GUARDIAN


The security services are facing questions over the cover-up of a Westminster paedophile ring as it emerged that files relating to official requests for media blackouts in the early 1980s were destroyed.

Two newspaper executives have told the Observer that their publications were issued with D-notices – warnings not to publish intelligence that might damage national security – when they sought to report on allegations of a powerful group of men engaging in child sex abuse in 1984. One executive said he had been accosted in his office by 15 uniformed and two non-uniformed police over a dossier on Westminster paedophiles passed to him by the former Labour cabinet minister Barbara Castle.

The other said that his newspaper had received a D-notice when a reporter sought to write about a police investigation into Elm Guest House, in southwest London, where a group of high-profile paedophiles was said to have operated and may have killed a child. Now it has emerged that these claims are impossible to verify or discount because the D-notice archives for that period “are not complete”.

The two journalists, Don Hale, the former editor of the Bury Messenger, and Hilton Tims, news editor of the Surrey Comet between 1980 and 1988, both recall their publications being issued with D-notices around 1984. ... He [Hale] had been given a file by Castle, by then an MEP, which had details of a Home Office investigation into allegations made by the Tory MP Geoffrey Dickens of the existence of a Westminster paedophile ring. The files contained the name of 16 MPs said to be involved and another 40 who were supportive of the goals of the Paedophile Information Exchange, which sought to reduce the age of consent.

HERE'S THE SUMMARY OF THE BENGHAZI REPORT


I used http://www.onlineocr.net/ to convert the PDF image files to MS Word files.



Executive Summary
The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence ("HPSCI" or "the Committee") conducted a comprehensive and exhaustive investigation into the tragic attacks against two U.S. facilities in Benghazi, Libya on September 11-12, 2012. The nearly two-year investigation focused on the activities of the Intelligence Community ("IC") before, during, and after the attacks. During the course of thousands of hours of detailed investigation, HPSCI reviewed thousands of pages of intelligence assessments, cables, notes, and emails; held 20 Committee events and hearings; and conducted detailed interviews with senior intelligence officials and eyewitnesses to the attacks, including eight security personnel on the ground in Benghazi that night.
This report details the findings and conclusions of HPSCI's investigation. In summary, the Committee first concludes that the CIA ensured sufficient security for CIA facilities in Benghazi and, without a requirement to do so, ably and bravely assisted the State Department on the night of the attacks. Their actions saved lives. Appropriate U.S. personnel made reasonable tactical decisions that night, and the Committee found no evidence that there was either a stand down order or a denial of available air support. The Committee, however, received evidence that the State Department security personnel, resources, and equipment were unable to counter the terrorist threat that day and required CIA assistance.
Second, the Committee finds that there was no intelligence failure prior to the attacks. In the months prior, the IC provided intelligence about previous attacks and the increased threat environment in Benghazi, but the IC did not have specific, tactical warning of the September 11 attacks.
Third, the Committee finds that a mixed group of individuals, including those affiliated with Al­Qa'ida, participated in the attacks on U.S. facilities in Benghazi, although the Committee finds that the intelligence was and remains conflicting about the identities, affiliations, and motivations of the attackers.
Fourth, the Committee concludes that after the attacks, the early intelligence assessments and the Administration's initial public narrative on the causes and motivations for the attacks were not fully accurate. There was a stream of contradictory and conflicting intelligence that came in after the attacks. The Committee found intelligence to support CIA's initial assessment that the attacks had evolved out of a protest in Benghazi; but it also found contrary intelligence, which ultimately proved to be the correct intelligence. There was no protest. The CIA only changed its initial assessment about a protest on September 24, 2012, when closed caption television footage became available on September 18, 2012 (two days after Ambassador Susan Rice spoke), and after the FBI began publishing its interviews with U.S. officials on the ground on September 22, 2012.
Fifth, the Committee finds that the process used to generate the talking points HPSCI asked for—and which were used for Ambassador Rice's public appearances—was flawed. HPSCI asked for the talking points solely to aid Members' ability to communicate publicly using the best available intelligence at the time, and mistakes were made in the process of how those talking points were developed.

 


Finally, the Committee found no evidence that any officer was intimidated, wrongly forced to sign a nondisclosure agreement or otherwise kept from speaking to Congress, or polygraphed because of their presence in Benghazi. The Committee also found no evidence that the CIA conducted unauthorized activities in Benghazi and no evidence that the IC shipped arms to Syria.