THE LIE MACHINE RESPONDS TO THE 2ND BRITISH MEMO

THE LIE:

White House defends Iraq postwar planning
Jun 12, 8:23
PM EDT
http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/W/WHITE_HOUSE_IRAQ?SITE=AZTUS&SECTION=HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT&CTIME=2005-06-12-20-23-06


WASHINGTON (AP) -- The White House took exception Sunday to the reported characterization of a British memo questioning the adequacy of U.S. planning for a postwar occupation of Iraq.
"There was significant post war planning," said spokesman David Almacy. "More importantly, the memo in question was written eight months before the war began; there was significant post war planning in the time that elapsed."

THE TRUTH:

Major Calls Effort in Iraq 'Mediocre'
By Thomas E. Ricks
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A24891-2004Dec24.html

Washington Post Staff Writer
Saturday, December 25, 2004; Page A01

"There was no Phase IV plan" for occupying Iraq after the combat phase, writes Maj. Isaiah Wilson III, who served as an official historian of the campaign and later as a war planner in Iraq. While a variety of government offices had considered the possible situations that would follow a U.S. victory, Wilson writes, no one produced an actual document laying out a strategy to consolidate the victory after major combat operations ended.
During the period in question, from April to June 2003, Wilson was a researcher for the Army's Operation Iraqi Freedom Study Group. Then, from July 2003 to March 2004, he was the chief war planner for the 101st Airborne Division, which was stationed in northern Iraq.
As a result of the failure to produce a plan, Wilson asserts, the U.S. military lost the dominant position in Iraq in the summer of 2003 and has been scrambling to recover ever since. "In the two to three months of ambiguous transition, U.S. forces slowly lost the momentum and the initiative . . . gained over an off-balanced enemy," he writes. "The United States, its Army and its coalition of the willing have been playing catch-up ever since."
Many in the Army have blamed Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and other top Pentagon civilians for the unexpectedly difficult occupation of Iraq, but Wilson reserves his toughest criticism for Army commanders who, he concludes, failed to grasp the strategic situation in Iraq and so not did not plan properly for victory. He concludes that those who planned the war suffered from "stunted learning and a reluctance to adapt."
Wilson contends that a lack of sufficient troops was a consequence of the earlier, larger problem of failing to understand that prevailing in Iraq involved more than just removing Hussein. "This overly simplistic conception of the 'war' led to a cascading undercutting of the war effort: too few troops, too little coordination with civilian and governmental/non-governmental agencies . . . and too little allotted time to achieve 'success,' " he writes.