THE NSA'S INSPECTOR GENERAL

The IG plays a role in overseeing the NSA domestic spying and reportedly has not received even one complaint from an NSA employee about the program. I wanted to find out who the IG was because I suspected it might be another "Michael Brown"-type appointee or even worse but that information is not on the NSA's site.

So, I wrote to them and requested both the name of the IG and a brief bio. Here's what they sent me:


Joel F. Brenner

As Inspector General of the National Security Agency, Joel F. Brenner monitors the lawfulness of the Agency’s activities across a broad area, including counter-terrorism and privacy issues. Before joining NSA in 2002 he was a trial attorney in the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division. Later, in his own law firm, his practice included civil and criminal trials, U.S. and international arbitrations, corporate governance and investigations, securities regulation, and a variety of contract disputes. He is a graduate of the University of Wisconsin (BA, 1969), the University of London (LSE, PhD, 1973), and Harvard Law School (JD,1975) and is a Marshall Scholar and Wilson Fellow. Mr. Brenner’s publications include “Information Oversight: Lessons from Foreign Intelligence,” published jointly by the Heritage Foundation and the Center for Democracy and Technology, September 30, 2004; “Exon-Florio: Presidential Authority to Suspend or Prohibit Acquisitions, Mergers, or Takeover by Foreign Persons” (Westlaw: 1990); Rent Control in North America and Four European Countries (with H.M. Franklin; Potomac Institute, 1976); and “Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution,” 3 J. Leg. Studies 403, 1974.

Here are some results from Google:

NSA Inspector General Joel F. Brenner said in 2004 that the agency's intelligence officers have no choice but to rely on "electronic filtering, sorting and dissemination systems of amazing sophistication but that are imperfect." LINK

That statement by Brenner comes from a lecture he gave at the (drum roll) Heritage Foundation. Here's a pertinent excerpt:

In 1976, the Senate established the Select Committee on Intelligence to provide legislative oversight of the intelligence community. A year later, the House followed suit and set up the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. [snip] Before 1976 these imperatives seemed frequently irreconcilable; one or the other (usually disclosure) was often sacrificed--or else the disclosure was handled in a private, off-the-record exchange with a powerful legislator.18 Releasing classified information to 535 members of Congress, and inevitably to their staffs, would create an unacceptable risk of disclosure. [snip] Depending on the sensitivity of particular disclosures, the executive releases classified information either to the chairmen and ranking members of the two committees, or to the entire committees--but not to the entire Congress. Regardless of your view of whether this arrangement can be improved, it solves a fundamental problem. It also addresses the corrosive effect of secrecy: as Frederick Hitz recently paraphrased Lord Acton, "absolute secrecy corrupts absolutely."19 The Intelligence Committees removed the excuse for absolute secrecy.

[snip]

As a practical matter, however, NSA's Inspector General conducts the most intense and effective executive oversight of NSA's operations.21 In that capacity I have broad authority to audit, investigate, and inspect virtually any activity in the Agency, and I exercise that authority through a competent and experienced staff of more than 60 professionals and support personnel. Our collective experience in conducting oversight of a large, far-flung, and technically sophisticated intelligence agency may have something to teach legislators and policy-makers contemplating an expanded role for domestic antiterrorism activities. I will not enter here into the debate over the wisdom or necessity of such activities; but to the extent that they may be done, they should be done well--and scrupulously according to law.