A Review Essay of H. R. McMaster's Dereliction of Duty.,
By: Wirtz, James J.,
Political Science Quarterly,
00323195,
Spring99, Vol. 114, Issue 1
James J. Wirtz is associate professor of national security affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School. His most recent book, which is edited with T. V. Paul, is The Absolute Weapon Revisited: Nuclear Arms and the Emerging International Order.
(EXCERPTS)
Dereliction of Duty constitutes an important contribution to the literature on America's involvement in Vietnam. From the perspective of a field-grade officer, however, McMaster's depiction of American military leaders is disturbing because it highlights the Joint Chiefs' fundamental incompetence. The faith that officers achieve high command because of their accomplishments and an ability to succeed in war sustains those who must actually risk their lives on the battlefield. To confront the possibility that nothing but incompetence, neglect, and disorder characterize senior ranks is almost too much to bear for officers who must lead soldiers into battle.
McMaster is quite clear that the Chiefs never really focused on the situation in Vietnam until it was too late. Their opinions about the war were determined by efforts to advance bureaucratic interests or to guard institutional positions that they had come to personify. Less credible, however, is McMaster's conclusion that early in the war the Joint Chiefs seemed to realize that the United States was headed for disaster in Vietnam. ... McMaster is correct to note that doubts existed about American involvement in the conflict, but to claim that a clear image of looming disaster was widespread is not supported by the evidence.
Saturday, September 23, 2006
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