BREMER'S IRAQ BOOK

Entitled "My Year in Iraq," in it Bremer claims that both Rummy and Fredo were made aware of the troop shortage BEFORE Bremer arrived in Iraq.

From Page 10, hardcover edition:

The paper was a draft RAND report estimating the troop levels that would needed to stabilize postwar Iraq. The study was impartial, and unflinching. The professionals at RAND did not deal in rosy scenarios; they applied cold Iogic problems.

The study examined the relationship between troop levels and stability d ing seven previous occupations, ranging from the Allies^' post—World War II perience in Germany and Japan to Somalia in 1993, the Balkans later that decade, and our recent experience in Afghanistan. Although I was not a military expert, I found the conclusions persuasive. And troubling.

The historical record demonstrated that to achieve stability in the ini years after military occupation there should be twenty occupying troops every one thousand people in the country occupied.

"The population of Iraq today," the report noted, "is nearly 25 million. The population would require 500,000 troops on the ground to meet a standarc 20 troops per thousand residents. This number is more than three times number of foreign troops now deployed to Iraq.^"

That afternoon, I had a summary of the draft copied and sent it down the corridor to Don Rumsfeld. "I think you should consider this," I said in my cover memo.

I never heard back from him about the report.

From Page 12:

"There's one other important issue, Mr. President," I added. "Troop levels. I'm a diplomat, not a general. But I just saw a pretty persuasive draft port arguing that to stabilize Iraq we'll probably need an awful lot more than we now have."

Bush listened carefully and noted that Secretary Powell and the State Department were trying to enlist more troops from friendly countries. "But I'll mention it," he said.