CURRENT INTELL ON IRAQ & IRAN

Here are some excerpts from a recent Senate hearing that bear on the questions of Al Qaeda in Iraq, the threat of Iran developing a nuclear weapon, the likelihood of the escalation working and the source of weapons for the insurgents.


Copyright 2007 Federal News Service, Inc.
All Rights Reserved Federal News Service
February 27, 2007 Tuesday
SECTION: CAPITOL HILL HEARING
LENGTH: 28512 words
HEADLINE: HEARING OF THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE; SUBJECT: CURRENT AND FUTURE WORLDWIDE THREATS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES; CHAIRED BY: SENATOR CARL LEVIN (D-MI); WITNESSES: THOMAS FINGAR, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE FOR ANALYSIS, AND CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL LIEUTENANT GENERAL MICHAEL MAPLES, U.S. ARMY, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY VICE ADMIRAL JOHN MCCONNELL, U.S. NAVY (RETIRED), DIRECTOR, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE;
LOCATION: SH-216 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C.

ADM. MCCONNELL: First, the current security and political trends in Iraq are moving in a negative direction. Particularly after the February 2006 bombing of the mosque at Samarra, sectarian violence has become self- sustaining. Unless efforts to reverse these conditions gain real traction during the 12- to 18-month time frame of this estimate, we assess that the security situation will continue to deteriorate at a rate comparable to the latter half of 2006.

Second, success by the stronger and more loyal Iraqi security forces supported by the coalition in reducing violence could give Iraqi political leaders breathing space to pursue political compromise needed for progress and stability. But even if the violence declines, the current level of sectarian animosity will make political reconciliation difficult over the next 12 to 18 months.

Third, if coalition forces were withdrawn rapidly during the time frame of this estimate, we judge that this almost certainly would lead to a significant increase in the scale and scope of sectarian conflict, intensify Sunni resistance to the Iraqi government, and have adverse consequences for national reconciliation. In addition, al Qaeda would be likely to use Anbar province to plan for increased attacks.

Fourth, while outside actors are not likely to be a major driver of violence or the prospects of stability, Iranian lethal support for select groups of Iraq Shi'a militants clearly intensifies the conflict in Iraq. Additionally, Syria continues to provide safe haven for expatriate Iraqi Ba'athists and to take less than adequate measures to stop the flow of foreign jihadists into Iraq.

While our information is incomplete, we estimate Iran could produce a nuclear weapon by early to mid next decade.

GEN. MAPLES: The situation in Iraq will remain an extremely complex and challenging security environment as the conflict remains fundamentally a sectarian struggle for power and the right to define Iraq's future identity.

We have noted a change in the character and the dynamics of the conflict. The perception of unchecked violence is creating an atmosphere of fear, hardening sectarianism, empowering militias and vigilante groups and undermining confidence in government and security forces. Conflict in Iraq is in a self-sustaining cycle in which violent acts increasingly generate retaliation.

Attacks by terrorist groups account for only a limited portion of insurgent violence...

Al Qaeda remains the most dominate terrorist organization and the most significant threat to U.S. interests worldwide. Despite being forced to decentralize its network, al Qaeda retains the ability to organize complex, mass casualty attacks and to inspire others. Al Qaeda's increasing cooperation with like-minded groups has improved its ability to facilitate, support and direct its objectives.

ADM. MCCONNNELL: I think the Iraqi political leaders have close to impossible tasks: (1) the sectarian violence on the one hand; and (2) pressure to make progress. The question is, will leadership emerge and be capable of taking the country to the next level?

SEN. WARNER: But why did we start the program until these components were in place before we put in harm's way the U.S. forces? That's my question. And do you have any further facts to share with this committee and the Congress about the participation today, this moment, of the Iraqi forces?

GEN. MAPLES: Sir, the Iraqis have moved two of the three brigades they said they would move into Baghdad.

SEN. WARNER: But they showed up with half force levels, didn't they?

GEN. MAPLES: Sir, the range that I have seen in the battalion manning is between 43 and 82 percent of manning in those battalions.

GEN. MAPLES:So the assessment by those who are embedded with the units and our commanders on the ground is that the units that are moving into Baghdad are in fact capable units. There are some limitations associated with that, and in fact, two of the three brigades are Kurdish brigades. And so you have some issues associated with language, with cultural understanding and with serving in an area in which the individuals were not recruited. And that will be an issue that has to be worked through.

SEN. WEBB:...What is your evaluation of the scope of influence of the current Iraqi government? What I mean by that is, how much control do you really believe it has in terms of implementing the requirements that we are attempting to put on it?

ADM. MCCONNELL: Senator, I don't think they yet have the kind of scope and influence that we would hope they would have, or that they could be successful in the short term.

SEN. WEBB: Would you compare the situation to, say, the situation in Lebanon?

ADM. MCCONNELL: Going back in time, I would compare it to Lebanon, yes sir, primarily because of the such deep divisions in the country with regard to the sectarianism and one force -- Sunni on Shi'a, Shi'a on Sunni.


SEN. REED: Well, the question would be, if you had to establish the probability of a successful attack being organized and directed against the United States, would it emanate from Pakistan, with this newly revised al Qaeda leadership, or would it come out of Iraq?

ADM. MCCONNELL: Two ways, two lines of reasoning to answer that. First of all, Iraq is a cause celebre for the jihadists in creating forces. My belief is the attack most likely would be planned and come out of the leadership in Pakistan. However, that said, there are al Qaeda elements, as you know, in Iraq and in Syria and other places, and even in Europe. And our information tells us they also are planning. Many would think of this as a command and control global net controlled from Pakistan. It isn't. There is some central planning and control and funding and so on, but individual, home-grown elements that are inspired by that vision are also a big problem for us.

SEN. BAYH: So if someone indicated in the last four months or so, let's say, that we were absolutely winning in Iraq, that is a mistaken assessment?

ADM. MCCONNELL: I wouldn't agree that we were winning. I think the conditions in 2006 were where it became most dramatically evident that the strategy was not being successful. And my sense is that's why there were adjustments made to the strategy.

SEN. BAYH: And based upon your understanding today, if, in the last couple of months, someone came to me and said that we had absolutely had enormous successes in Iraq, what would your response to that be?

ADM. MCCONNELL: Enormous successes in previous years?

SEN. BAYH: The bottom line in Iraq was that we had had enormous successes.

ADM. MCCONNELL: Sir, as we said in the estimate, it was going in a negative direction and sectarian violence was increasing. And my view is that's why the policy changed.

SEN. CLINTON:... . What is the best estimate of the U.S. intelligence community for how long it would take for Iran to develop nuclear weapons and the capacity to deliver them? And what degree of confidence do you have in that estimate?

ADM. MCCONNELL: The earliest they could produce a nuclear weapon would be early next decade, more likely mid-next decade.

SEN. CLINTON: And by mid-next decade, are we talking 2015?

ADM. MCCONNELL: We would be talking 2015.

SEN. CLINTON: And when that date is reached, 2015, which is the earliest that they could produce a nuclear weapon, would they then have the capacity to deliver that nuclear weapon?

ADM. MCCONNELL: It depends on how they develop their program. If they were to start the program for delivery consistent with the development of a nuclear weapon, they could match and marry up at the -- in the same timeframe. Normally it would take a little longer to have a delivery capability.

ADM. MCCONNELL: Two comments. One, there is an attempt of stop the flow of any traffic across that border, but most of the weapons that are being used inside Iraq are there now. I mean, it's not a matter of resupply; it's just that the stocks that were there from the Saddam era are just huge.

SEN. GRAHAM: Does al Qaeda believe that the outcome in Iraq is part of their overall strategy?

ADM. MCCONNELL: I wouldn't go so far as to say al Qaeda would necessarily believe that. Al Qaeda may have --

SEN. GRAHAM: Haven't they said that? (Chuckles.)

ADM. MCCONNELL: Well, they want to reestablish their base, and their objective could be in Afghanistan.

SEN. GRAHAM: Okay. So you don't think al Qaeda sees democracy in Iraq as a threat to their agenda?

ADM. MCCONNELL: Well, you describe al Qaeda as one large organization. There are elements of al Qaeda in Iraq and in --

SEN. GRAHAM: And -- I don't want to use any more -- the bottom line is, if we withdraw to Kuwait, what's the likelihood that al Qaeda-type elements would follow us to Kuwait?

ADM. MCCONNELL: Unlikely.