SOME GOOD NEWS AND THE FEAR CARD

First, the good news. In a press conference on 7/19/2007, we learned that Al Qaeda in Iraq has its hands full.

LT. GEN. ODIERNO: What I know is there is clearly a relationship between al Qaeda in Iraq and al Qaeda leadership in Pakistan or Afghanistan or wherever they are. I -- al Qaeda in Iraq, I think, is struggling as -- with its mission here in Iraq, and currently I think it'd be very difficult for them to export any violence outside of Iraq.

What they might be talking about, though, is -- of course there are always -- there are -- they might be -- some of the things they've done here in Iraq, people might be learning from. There might be people who have come in here for short periods of time that were foreigners that left here that might try to conduct some attacks. But I think -- what I really think is there's an attempt here by the leadership of al Qaeda to create a training area and a place where they can recruit and train people in the Middle East, and that's why they would like us to fail here, so they can use Iraq as that base. That, in my mind, is the threat to us in the future, and that's what I see the biggest threat out of al Qaeda in Iraq.

Odie repeats the lie that implies Al Qaeda has a chance of setting up a base in Iraq but more important, he ignores the real problem: Pakistan. This is from Sunday's Meet the Press (7/22/07) :

MR. RUSSERT: This intelligence report that came out this month raised a lot of alarm and concern in the U.S., and it seems to be in stark contrast to the National Intelligence Estimate from last April, this one. And let me read that key judgment to you: “United States-led counterterrorism efforts have seriously damaged leadership of al-Qaeda and disrupted its operations.
“We assess that the global jihadist movement is decentralized, lacks a coherent global strategy,” “is becoming more diffuse.” That seems so different than your assessment in July of ‘07. What a difference a year makes. What changed? We were told that the al-Qaeda had been, in many ways, close to being destroyed or dismantled.

Admiral McCONNELL: Following the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, about two-thirds of al-Qaeda’s, not only leadership, but their soldiers, the foot soldiers, had been eliminated. And, at that point in time, that was an accurate assessment of where we were.
Now, what happened? What’s different? What changed? In Pakistan, where they’re enjoying a safe haven, the government of Pakistan chose to try a political solution. The political solution meant a peace treaty with a region that’s never been governed—not governed from the outside, not governed by Pakistan. The opposite occurred. Instead of pushing al-Qaeda out, the people who live in the—these federally- administered tribal areas, rather than pushing al-Qaeda out, they made a safe haven for training and recruiting. And so, in that period of time, al-Qaeda has been able to regain some of its momentum. The leadership’s intact, they have operational planners, and they have safe haven. The thing they’re missing are operatives inside the United States. So that’s the difference between last year and this year, in, in our assessment.

It's pretty clear to me that Al Qaeda couldn't have been that badly damaged if it can recover so much strength in just one year. This also makes our Iraq foray even more questionable.