PR PETRAEUS DEFENDS EARLIER POLLYANNA STATEMENTS

Back in 2004, PR Petraeus made several wildly optimistic statements about how the training of the Iraqi security forces was going and at the Senate Armed Services Committee hearing¹, SEN. BOB CASEY (D-PA) asked PR about them. PR tried to defend them but I remain unconvinced. Let's recall that he made these statements several years ago and then think about how little progress we've seen in the security forces.

(excerpts)

SEN. BOB CASEY (D-PA): In October of '05 you talked about enormous progress with Iraqi security forces. September of '04 you asserted that we have -- we've seen -- or you said, "I see," in your case, tangible progress for the Iraqi security forces.
And I just ask you: When you look at both of those, your testimony and your references to progress at different points in time, and the reality of what's not happening with regard to Iraqi security forces, I think you can understand -- and I'd ask you to comment on this --

GEN. PETRAEUS: Sure.

SEN. CASEY: -- not just the general frustration that we feel but frankly some of the skepticism we feel about your assertions in the past, your assertions here, as it compares to what the reality is on that particular question of the Iraqi security forces.

GEN. PETRAEUS: Well, actually I appreciate the opportunity to address that, Senator. I really don't think that saying that one sees tangible progress is an extraordinary statement. I did see tangible progress. Iraq had gone from zero battalions in May or so to, I think, at that point in time a modest number of eight or nine. That's tangible progress. We were reestablishing a whole variety of different structures. They were training. I mean, it was -- that's what it was.

And if you read the rest of the op-ed, there's also qualifications. It talks about challenges. It likens, I think, the effort to, you know, building the world's biggest aircraft while in flight and while being shot at, at the same time.

I think it's very important -- and I've tried to mention this earlier -- not to get too hung up on ORA 1 or ORA 2. Those are readiness assessments that we established actually a couple of years ago, I think. And it has to do with, you know, do they have a certain percentage of the people they're supposed to have, the leaders, the equipment, and a variety of other assessments? That doesn't mean --

SEN. CASEY: Let me just interrupt you one second. But that still has to be the goal, though, doesn't it? Level 1 has to be --

GEN. PETRAEUS: Well, certainly. As I said in my long statement, we take that very seriously, and we want to fix all those shortcomings. But the fact is that I don't know that they're going to be able to fix some of this shortcomings in the number of noncommissioned officers in particular, or number of officers. It just takes time to develop them. And let's remember: they've taken serious losses.

And I would state again that one big difference between October '05 or whenever it was that I had some optimism -- and actually, my words already, even at that time, if you look at any briefing to your colleagues, was qualified optimist. And I've dropped even "optimist" at this point and just say that as a realist.

But the point really is that a unit may not have all the NCOs it's supposed to have, and it may not reach the level for ORA-1, where it's supposed to have to do independent operations; it still may do independent operations, and that is the case in a number of different areas. And it depends a great deal, actually, on the local conditions. If we can get the local conditions to a better state as, say, is the case in, say, in Nasiriyah or in Anbar even or some of the other areas, then all of a sudden they can actually do reasonably well; even without having sort of met these criteria, they're actually doing it.

In fact, we have some other criteria that just asked the assessment of can they do independent operations just judgment as opposed to do they have all the equipment? You know, every time they lose a piece of equipment in combat, which happens fairly frequently, it's -- until they can get their logistical structure set up, it's just going to drive them down that readiness. And I put the slide in there to be up front, to show, in fact, that they did go backwards in some areas between last year because of the sectarian violence and the tough fighting.

So I think, again, we don't want to get too fixated on these ORAs. They're important indicators, we need to try to help them everywhere we can to get those levels up, just as we would with our own units, but it doesn't mean that they cannot be conducting actually independent operations because they're ORA-2 instead of ORA-1, if that makes sense to you.

¹Federal News Service
September 11, 2007 Tuesday

SECTION: CAPITOL HILL HEARINGLENGTH: 37838 words
HEARING OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE SUBJECT: IRAQ: THE CROCKER-PETRAEUS REPORT CHAIRED BY: SENATOR JOSEPH BIDEN (D-DE) WITNESSES: GENERAL DAVID PETRAEUS, U.S. ARMY, COMMANDER, MULTINATIONAL FORCE IRAQ; RYAN CROCKER, U.S. AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ LOCATION: 216 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C. TIME: 9:30 A.M. EDT DATE: TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 11, 2007