GAO: THE SURGE HAS FAILED

(Via McClatchy)

SECURING, STABILIZING, AND REBUILDING IRAQ
GAO Audits and Key Oversight Issues

For Release on Delivery Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT
Tuesday, October 30, 2007


In summary, we found that

- Since GAO last reported on the status of the 18 Iraqi benchmarks in September 2007, the number of enemy attacks in Iraq has declined. While political reconciliation will take time, Iraq has not yet advanced key legislation on equitably sharing oil revenues and holding provincial elections. In addition, sectarian influences within the Iraqi ministries continue while militia influences divide the loyalties of Iraqi security forces.

- Key U.S. efforts to stabilize and rebuild Iraq lack strategies with clear purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, and performance measures. The weaknesses in U.S. strategic planning are compounded by the Iraqi government’s lack of integrated strategic planning in its critical energy sector.

- The U.S. strategy assumed that the Iraqi government and international community funds would help finance Iraq’s development needs. However, the Iraqi government has limited capacity to spend reconstruction funds. In addition, the international community has provided funds for Iraq’s reconstruction, but most of the funding offered has been in the form of loans that the Iraqis have not accessed.