AL QAEDA IN IRAQ: A NEW STUDY

Via Taylor Marsh and Lorelei Kelly. I learned about a preliminary study of foreign fighters in Iraq done by the Counter Terrorism Center at West Point. I'd like to present here a few excerpts I found informative. The first one is about the composition of the insurgency:

The vast majority of militants in Iraq have nothing to do with al‐Qa’ida, and they are focused on Iraqi problems: security, distribution of power and money, and sectarianism. Those insurgents are a mix of Sunni nationalists, Ba’thists, Shi’a militias, and Islamistorganizations. Mistaking any of these groups for al-Qa’ida is not simply wrong, it is dangerous.

This is the composition of the foreign fighters:

Saudi Arabia was by far the most common nationality of the fighters’ in this sample; 41% (244) of the 595 records that included the fighter’s nationality indicated they were of Saudi Arabian origin. Libya was the next most common country of origin, with 18.8% (112) of the fighters listing their nationality stating they hailed from Libya. Syria, Yemen and Algeria were the next most common origin countries with 8.2% (49), 8.1% (48), and 7.2% (43), respectively. Moroccans accounted for 6.1% (36) of the records and Jordanians 1.9% (11).

All these fighters crossed the border from Syria. This is problematic for Syria because the jihadists consider the regime as apostates:

The Syrian government is led by a Ba’athist regime dominated by members of the Alawite sect, which is a form of Shi’a Islam that embraces elements similar to Christian theology. … Syria has an interest in keeping the U.S.‐backed regime in Iraq off balance, but it must also fear a backlash from jihadi groups, many of which despise Alawite “apostasy” as much or more than the United States. Indeed, some of Abu Mus’ab al‐Zarqawi’s most important early recruits were veterans of the Muslim Brotherhood’s uprising against the Syrian government in the1980s. For Syria, supporting jihadi groups is at best a double‐edged sword.

Finally, a VERY positive conclusion:

The Islamic State of Iraq has failed politically because it has been unable to balance the practical demands of its local Iraqi constituency and the religious demands of its foreign supporters. The ISI’s clumsy effort to balance these demands has alienated it from other Sunni insurgents. The U.S. should not be content to exploit this failure only in Iraq. The ISI’s political failure exemplifies the fundamental bankruptcy of al‐Qa’ida’s ideology. The U.S., its allies, and moderates of all kinds, can discretely use the ISI’s political failure to illustrate that larger ideological point.