WE'VE SEEN THIS BEFORE

Just like there was no real post-war plan, there's no real post-surge. In both cases, hope took precedence over prudence and led to a poorer outcome. The WaPo puts it this way in the headline, "GAO Report Faults Post-'Surge' Planning." Here's the key point:

The report, after a bleak GAO assessment last summer, cited little improvement in the ability of the Iraqi security forces to act independently of the U.S. military, and noted that key legislation passed by the Iraqi parliament had not been implemented while other crucial laws had not been passed. The report also judged that key Iraqi ministries spent less of their allocated budgets last year than in previous years, and said that oil and electricity production had repeatedly not met U.S. targets.

Bush's strategy of January 2007, the GAO said, "defined the original goals and objectives that the Administration believed were achievable by the end of this phase in July 2008." Not meeting many of them changed circumstances on the ground and the pending withdrawal of the last of the additional U.S. forces mean that strategy is now outdated, the report said. The GAO recommends that the State and Defense departments work together to fashion a new approach.

The WaPo and the NY Times both report this very important finding:

For example, in an analysis based on a classified study of Iraqi Army battalions, the office concludes that just 10 percent of them are capable of operating independently in counterinsurgency operations and that even then they rely on American support.

Billions of dollars and thousands of lives, and STILL only 10% of Iraqi forces are worth a damn!