P: In the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) of 2002, where their collective views were summarized, one of the conclusions offered with “high confidence” was that
Iraq is continuing, and in some areas expanding its chemical, biological, nuclear, and missile programs contrary to UN resolutions.
The intelligence agencies of Britain, Germany, Russia, China, Israel, and—yes—France all agreed with this judgment.
TRUTH: Neither the Russians nor the French were convinced of the nuclear claims. LINK
Russia was not convinced by either the September 24, 2002 British dossier or the October 4, 2002 CIA report. Lacking sufficient evidence, Russia dismissed the claims as a part of a "propaganda furor." Specifically targeting the CIA report, Putin said, "Fears are one thing, hard facts are another."
French intelligence services did not come up with the same alarming assessment of Iraq and WMD as did the Britain and the United States. "According to secret agents at the DGSE, Saddam's Iraq does not represent any kind of nuclear threat at this time.It [the French assessment] contradicts the CIA's analysis."5 French spies said that the Iraqi nuclear threat claimed by the United States was a "phony threat."6
P: No wonder, then, that another conclusion the NIE of 2002 reached with “high confidence” was that Iraq could make a nuclear weapon in months to a year once it acquires sufficient weapons-grade fissile material.1
TRUTH: “The acquisition of sufficient fissile material is Iraq's principal hurdle in developing a nuclear weapon.” (2002 NIE White Paper) Iraq had no way to import fissile material and no way to make it.
P: Still, even many who believed that Saddam did possess WMD, and was ruthless enough to use them, accused Bush of telling a different sort of lie by characterizing the risk as “imminent.” But this, too, is false: Bush consistently rejected imminence as a justification for war.
STATUS: Bush consistently described the threat from Saddam as “grave and growing” and strongly implied that we don’t have much time left to deal with him.
“The danger to our country is grave and it is growing.” 9/28/02
“The danger to America from the Iraqi regime is grave and growing.”
“Delay, indecision, and inaction are not options for America, because they could lead to massive and sudden horror.” 10/05/02
“The danger is already significant, and it only grows worse with time.”
“Iraq could decide on any given day to provide a biological or chemical weapon to a terrorist group or individual terrorists.” 10/07/02
P: But the consensus on which Bush relied was not born in his own administration. In fact, it was first fully formed in the Clinton administration. … This Democratic drumbeat continued and even intensified when Bush succeeded Clinton in 2001, and it featured many who would later pretend to have been deceived by the Bush White House.
STATUS: Misleading. Podhoretz conflates statements made by Democrats before Operation Desert Fox (12/16/98) and statements made in 2002. He also ignores the profound difference between a 4-day air assault and a full-blown invasion. The consensus during the Clinton Administration was to have a policy of containment toward Saddam with a more direct confrontation always possible: As Defense Secretary Cohen put it in this exchange on 12/20/98:
Q: Do you plan to try to convince the U.N. to send the UNSCOM inspectors back in or is that now a dead issue after the air strikes?
A: It's not at all a dead issue. As a matter or fact, Saddam Hussein will have the burden of demonstrating in some affirmative fashion that he is prepared to allow the inspectors to come back in to be effective. We are not going to simply go through the motions once again where he is able to obstruct their ability to carry out their mission. And so, he must demonstrate a willingness to allow the inspectors to come back and to complete their job. And barring that, we intend to maintain the containment policy which continues to keep the sanctions in place. We'll continue our military as we have been, in place and ready to take action, if it becomes necessary.
Q: If the UNSCOM inspectors are not allowed back in, will there be further air strikes?
A: We are prepared to carry out such air strikes, but we intend to maintain the containment policy and also to make sure that he doesn't threaten the region again. So we'll have our own intelligence observations and make the kind of determination that would lead us to the obvious conclusions.
P: What of the related charge that it was still another “lie” to suggest, as Bush and his people did, that a connection could be traced between Saddam Hussein and the al-Qaeda terrorists who had attacked us on 9/11? This charge was also rejected by the Senate Intelligence Committee. Contrary to how its findings were summarized in the mainstream media, the committee’s report explicitly concluded that al Qaeda did in fact have a cooperative, if informal, relationship with Iraqi agents working under Saddam.
STATUS: FALSE.
(U) Conclusion 90. The Central Intelligence Agency's assessment that Saddam Hussein was most likely to use his own intelligence service operatives to conduct attacks was reasonable, and turned out to be accurate.
(U) Conclusion 93. The Central Intelligence Agency reasonably assessed that there were likely several instances of contacts between Iraq and al-Qaida throughout the 1990s, but that these contacts did not add up to an established formal relationship.
(U) Conclusion 96. The Central Intelligence Agency's assessment that to date there was no evidence proving Iraqi complicity or assistance in an al-Qaida attack was reasonable and objective. No additional information has emerged to suggest otherwise.
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