A CULTURAL PROBLEM

BRIG. GEN. MICHAEL JONES lets us know some of the cultural barriers we are also facing in Iraq.

Why didn't the war wizards know any of this back in 2002?

GEN. JONES: Congressman, I think both. I think many of those things, had you known more about the Iraqis, some of their limitations, their culture, a lot of factors about them, you might have done some of them earlier. And in some cases the situation has obviously changed. Since when we first began doing this level of violence, a lot of other factors have changed pretty markedly.

Sir, in answer to the second question of why some things don't work, the Iraqi culture is just different. I call it the Inshala factor, and that is, in the U.S. we understand that there's a very clear cause-and-effect relationship between what you do and the results that you get; for instance, at the lowest level, firing a weapon. I know if I train somebody, that if I teach them the seven steady-hold factors, how to aim the weapon properly and so forth, that they'll hit the target with the bullet.

Because of the religious and cultural background of most Iraqis, they are very fatalistic and they believe that things are all based on the will of God. If God wants the bullet to hit the target, it'll hit the target, and what I do does not affect the outcome.

And so you have to establish a level of trust in a relationship with Iraqis in order to then persuade them to change their behavior in a way that then allows them to start performing at a higher trained level. So those are things that flat-out I didn't know when I first went to Iraq, that it took me a while to learn about Iraqis, and that then caused us to --

GEN. JONES: The effort to fire corrupt leaders inside the Ministry of Interior and inside the Ministry of Defense have -- we've seen a large improvement in that. I wouldn't tell you it's completely successful. It's an ongoing process.

GEN. JONES: I believe that in general, the nature of how the Iraqi government works is they have a long tradition of not merit- based promotion or selection, but what I guess we would kind of call either cronyism or some other method, but not being merit-based. We have been encouraging them to become merit-based. We've seen a significant amount of progress, but in the two security ministries, I think they're reflective of some of the problems they probably have in other ministries as well.


SOURCE:
Federal News Service
May 22, 2007 Tuesday
SECTION: CAPITOL HILL HEARING
LENGTH: 14690 words
HEADLINE: A HEARING OF THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE'S OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE;
SUBJECT: TRAINING OF IRAQI SECURITY FORCES AND EMPLOYMENT OF TRANSITION TEAMS;
CHAIRED BY: REPRESENTATIVE MARTY MEEHAN (D-MA);
WITNESSES: PETER VELZ OF THE OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS (MIDDLE EAST); BRIG. GEN. MICHAEL JONES, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR POLITICO-MILITARY AFFAIRS (MIDDLE EAST) FOR THE JOINT STAFF;
LOCATION: 2118 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C.