• The social fabric of Iraq has been torn apart.
• There is not ‘one’ civil war, nor ‘one’ insurgency, but several civil wars and insurgencies between different communities and organizations; there is also a range of actors seeking to undermine, overthrow or take control of the Iraqi government.
• Iraqi nationalisms exist, but one distinct ‘Iraqi’ nationalism does not. Iraq has fractured into regions dominated by sectarian, ethnic or tribal political groupings that have gained further strength from their control of informal local economies.
• Al-Qaeda has a very real presence in Iraq that has spread to the major cities of the centre and north of the country, including Baghdad, Kirkuk and Mosul. Although
Al-Qaeda’s position is challenged by local actors, it is a mistake to exaggerate the ability of tribal groups and other insurgents to stop the momentum building behind its operations in Iraq.
• Regional powers have a greater capacity than either the US or the UK to influence events in Iraq. This arises from a historical legacy of social interaction and religious association that exists irrespective of modern international state boundaries.
• The Iraqi government is not able to exert authority evenly or effectively over the country. Across huge swathes of territory, it is largely irrelevant in terms of ordering social, economic, and political life. At best, it is merely one of several ‘state-like actors’ that now exist in Iraq.
• Security in Iraq cannot be ‘normalized’ in a matter of months but instead should be considered within a time frame of many years. If the Multinational Force is withdrawn, Iraq’s nascent security services would not be able to cope with the current levels of insecurity."
Tuesday, May 22, 2007
A NON-U.S. VIEW OF IRAQ
Chatham House, a British think tank, recently produced a study of the prospects in Iraq and noted that we have to begin any discussion of the future by "understanding of the following realities:
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