KERREY STILL STUCK ON STUPID

In his latest WSJ op-ed, Kerrey is still trapped in the illusion that we can create a stable democracy in Afghanistan:

While success in Afghanistan may not look the same as it does in Iraq, I believe there is a very good chance that a stable democracy can survive there. ... The heroism of Afghan voters who turned out this past August in spite of the Taliban's violence should inspire us to stand by their side until security and stability are established in their country.

Now, let's use the memo from the DNI to get a serious view of the problems in Afghanistan.

1) We don't even know the number of the Taliban, let alone the other groups:

Calculating Taliban manpower is inherently difficult. Although the insurgency has steadily grown since the Taliban's ouster in late-2001, the blurred identities of the numerous groups contributing to instability in Afghanistan, along with the wide variety of factors motivating new recruits, complicate efforts to formulate a precise estimate of the size of the insurgency. Many fighters are part-time insurgents who have other occupations and are less ideologically or politically committed than full-time members of the insurgency, making any estimation of strength difficult and transitory.

2) Like Iraq, we have a hard time telling friend from foe:

Beyond full-time and ideologically committed senior leaders and their subordinate commanders, identifying who is and is not an "insurgent" becomes challenging, especially in a tribal society where local groups and power brokers constantly compete against one another as well as the government. In the Afghan context, Pashtun village and tribal elders, tribal khans, and mujahideen-era commanders are continually aligning and realigning against the government to advance their parochial interests. In many instances, aligning with an insurgent network is not necessarily an endorsement of insurgent objectives but a tactical decision to achieve any number of short-term ends, including exerting pressure on the provincial administration, tapping other sources of illicit revenue, and retaliating for perceived slights.

3) Also like Iraq, the central government is dysfunctional:

At a minimum, significant progress in Afghan National Security Forces, the judicial system, national and local governance, the economic sector, and improved regional relations remain necessary before Afghanistan is capable of providing security and basic services without significant foreign assistance.

We also don't have a group in Afghan, like we had in Iraq with the Anbar Uprising, who are willing to fight with us.